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We provide a new explanation why eective tax rates are smaller for larger rms
even in the absence of common channels like prot shifting and lobbying. This result
emerges in a heterogeneous rms model with endogenous mark-ups. Our framework
features imperfect tax pass-through into prices and partial deductibility of production
costs. Corporate taxes reduce mark-ups and hence pre-tax prots, especially for high
cost rms. As production costs are only partially deductible, high cost producers are
aected most by taxes. We further show that shocks which aect mark-ups through
competition, like globalization, reinforce the heterogeneity in eective tax rates across
rms.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing and controversial public debate on the relatively low tax payments
of large companies. In the period 2008-2015, the statutory corporate tax rate in the US
was 35 percent. However, the most protable companies out of the Fortune 500 paid on
average an eective tax rate of only 21.2 percent on their prots (Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy, 2017). Typical explanations for this observation are prot shifting of large
multinational rms (Desai et al. , 2006; Gumpert et al. , 2016; Davies et al. , 2018) and
better coordinated lobbying activities (Bombardini, 2008; Richter et al. , 2009).
In this paper, we provide a new explanation why the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax
prots (the eective tax rate) is smaller for larger rms. We show that this result can even
emerge in a closed-economy framework without prot-shifting or lobbying activities. All
we need for our argument is that mark-ups are endogenous and production costs are only
partially tax deductible. While existing studies explain lower eective tax rates of large
rms by legal or even illegal tax evasion, our study ties this fact to the underlying demand
structure in the market. To the best of our knowledge this explanation for low tax payments
of large rms is novel. We argue that this channel should be taken into account in empirical
research and in the debate on policy measures addressing tax evasion.
To derive our results, we introduce tax policy in a general equilibrium model with rm
heterogeneity and endogenous mark-ups following Melitz & Ottaviano (2008). Tax policy is
determined by two instruments: a tax rate on prots and a share of production costs that is
tax deductible. These measures have been used in recent tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening
reforms.1 In our framework with linear demand, corporate tax rates reduce mark-ups and
hence pre-tax prots which holds in particular for high cost rms. At the same time, these
rms can only deduct a fraction of their large production costs. As a consequence, the ratio
of tax payments to pre-tax prots is larger compared to low cost rms even in the absence of
common explanations such as prot shifting or lobbying. Interestingly, our model is also able
to provide a rationale for a positive relation between rm size and eective tax payments as
found in some empirical studies. This case occurs if production costs are subsidized by the
government.
Importantly, this result hinges on the demand structure that features endogenous mark-
ups. Empirical evidence shows indeed that more productive rms charge higher mark-ups
(De Loecker & Warzynski, 2012; Bellone et al. , 2016). However, the existing literature on
rm heterogeneity and corporate taxation typically builds on CES preferences. In such a
1For the OECD countries, the average statutory corporate tax rate has fallen from 39.9% in 1990 to 27.5%
in 2014 (Hauer & Langenmayr, 2015). At the same time, broadening of tax bases has led to an increase of
tax revenues despite of lower tax rates.
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framework prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal costs and our result would not
emerge as rms perfectly pass on taxes to consumers: a 1% increase of the corporate tax rate
leads to a 1% increase in prices.2 In our model with linear demand, there is only imperfect
pass-through of taxes into prices which reduces mark-ups. As high cost rms face more price
sensitive consumers they respond stronger to changes in tax policy. Consequently, the tax
burden relative to pre-tax prots increases more for small rms with lower productivity.
In the public debate, globalization is perceived as an important driving force for the het-
erogeneity in eective tax rates across rms as it facilitates prot-shifting of large companies.
We provide a new explanation for this observation by showing how general equilibrium ef-
fects change the eective tax payments of heterogeneous rms. Shocks which aect mark-ups
through the toughness of competition, such as trade liberalization, reinforce the heterogene-
ity in relative tax payments across rms. The reason behind this result is that a larger market
enhances rm entry which at the same time increases competition and hence, compresses
mark-ups in particular for small rms.
Our paper is related to recent research that analyzes tax competition for internationally
mobile rms that dier in their productivity (Baldwin & Okubo, 2009; Davies & Eckel, 2010;
Krautheim & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011; Hauer & Stahler, 2013). The focus of these papers
is to explain how countries of varying size optimally set tax policy and how heterogeneous
rms select into these countries. Related to our paper, Bauer & Langenmayr (2013) provide a
dierent rationale for the fact that large multinational rms pay relatively low taxes. They
show that prot taxation under the ruling arm's length principle allows most productive
rms to shift prots abroad even under full compliance with the tax code. In contrast, we
show that the relatively low eective tax rates of large rms can be explained even in a
closed-economy setting without prot shifting. Bauer et al. (2014) show that endogenous
tax policy in a model with rm heterogeneity represents an additional adjustment to trade
liberalization. In contrast to our work, this literature typically builds on a CES demand
structure and hence, does not capture our result which requires mark-ups to be rm-specic
and endogenous.3 Egger et al. (2018) highlight an alternative explanation for low eective
tax rates of large multinationals that can threat to relocate production which increases their
bargaining power with tax authorities.
Our paper is also related to empirical studies on the relation between the eective tax
rate and rm size. In a recent survey, Belz et al. (2018) document conicting results on
this relationship. Following the accounting literature, there are two competing theories that
2In a broader sense, our paper is related to a growing literature on mark-ups and cost pass through into
prices (Weyl & Fabinger, 2013; Mrazova & Neary, 2017).
3In the Appendix, we show that the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax prots is constant across rms in a
framework with CES preferences.
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explain this ambiguity. The political power theory assumes that larger rms have more
resources to inuence policy making in their favor which implies a lower eective tax rate for
large rms. In contrast, the political cost theory states that large companies face stronger
exposure to regulations which leads to a positive relation between rm size and the eective
tax rate. We contribute to this literature by adding an alternative explanation which arises
from the interaction of the tax system and the market structure.
2 The model
We introduce corporate taxes in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms that
follows the lines of Melitz & Ottaviano (2008). Importantly, our model features linear
demand leading to endogenous mark-ups. Throughout our study, we highlight novel results
that are specic to the demand system and contrast them to an alternative framework with
CES preferences where mark-ups would be constant (see Appendix).
In a rst step, we introduce tax policy which is determined by two instruments: a tax rate
on prots and a share of production costs that is tax deductible. Following this, we derive
consumer demand and optimal rm behavior to nally characterize a free entry equilibrium.
This setting allows us to derive our main result which shows relative tax payments as a
function of rm productivity. Moreover, we conduct comparative static exercises with respect
to changes in tax policy as well as globalization, and analyze the eects on the eective tax
rate at the rm level.
2.1 Consumers
We consider an economy that is endowed with L consumers each holding one unit of capital
which is the sole production factor. Consumers maximize utility over a continuum of dier-
entiated varieties indexed by i 2 
; and a homogenous outside good qc0 which is chosen as
numeraire. The utility is given by:4






















The parameter  indexes the degree of product dierentiation between the varieties. The
extreme case of  = 0 implies that products are perfectly substitutable and hence, consumers




qcidi. Moreover,  and
4The quadratic preferences give rise to a linear demand function and were rst developed in Ottaviano
et al. (2002). In the context of tax competition with homogeneous rms it was used in Ottaviano & van
Ypersele (2005).
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 determine the substitutability between the outside good and the dierentiated varieties.
Utility maximization of Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint leads to the following linear
inverse demand function:



















 as the subset of varieties that are actually consumed (i.e. qi > 0).










( + Np) . (4)
This is an important dierence to CES demand systems and implies that the price elasticity











is not constant and is not uniquely determined by the
degree of product dierentiation . Eq. (4) shows that tougher competition (increase in N
or decrease in p) increases the price elasticity for a given price level pi.
2.2 Firm behavior
Producing one unit of the numeraire good q0 requires one unit of capital as an input. We
assume that the market for this good is perfectly competitive and it is sold at a price
p0 = 1: These assumptions x the returns to capital to unity. The dierentiated sector is
characterized by monopolistic competition. Firms pay xed costs fE to enter the market
and draw marginal costs c from a distribution G (c) with support on [0; cM ]. Hence, the
productivity of a rm is determined by 1
c
. Firms only learn about their cost level after
incurring the xed entry costs. Given that the payment of fE is sunk, all rms that can
cover their marginal cost and generate positive after-tax prots survive and produce.
Before we derive optimal rm behavior, we characterize the tax system in the economy.
We follow Bauer et al. (2014) and assume that the government has two policy instruments:
i) the tax rate t and ii) a tax deductibility parameter  < 1. The latter determines the
tax base which is given by the rm's revenue less a tax-deductible share  of the variable
production costs. We assume that tax revenues are redistributed to consumers.5 Given this
5Because of the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, all income eects are absorbed by the outside
sector. Hence, the redistribution of tax revenues has no impact on the consumption of dierentiated varieties.
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tax regime, the after-tax prots  (c) of a rm with cost draw c are given by
 (c) = (p (c)  c) q (c)| {z }
Pre-tax prots
  t(p (c)  c) q (c)| {z }
Tax base
: (5)
We rewrite Eq. (5) as follows:
 (c) = (1  t) [p (c) 	c] q (c) ; (6)
where we denote 	 = (1 t)
(1 t)
as the tax factor. Throughout our analysis, we assume a partial
deductibility of production costs  < 1 implying that the tax factor is larger than one and
rises in the corporate tax rate. Eq. (6) shows that the tax factor 	 enters multiplicative
with production costs and hence, represents the eective cost of capital in our framework.6
In this case, tax policy has allocative consequences. Note that  > 1 would imply that
production costs are subsidized by the government such that 	 < 1.7 We will also discuss
the implications of this case below.
Given the existence of a choke price pmax, all rms with eective costs 	c larger than
pmax have to exit the market.8 We denote cD as the cost draw of a rm that just breaks even
and is indierent between serving or exiting the market, i.e. pmax = 	cD.
9 Following the
analysis of Melitz & Ottaviano (2008), all rm performance measures can now be written
as a function of the cost draw c and the cost cuto cD. Importantly, the latter variable is
determined endogenously in general equilibrium and depends both on the average price p as












(cD   c) , (9)





6Remember that the returns to capital are exogenous due to the existence of the outside sector and are
equal to unity.
7Throughout our analysis we assume parameter values such that 	 > 0.
8In comparison to frameworks with CES preferences (e.g. Melitz, 2003) there is no need for any xed
costs to derive rm exits.
9The underlying assumption is that cM > cD which implies that some rms are exiters.
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whereas  (c) = p (c) 	c denotes the mark-up of a rm with cost c.
More productive rms set lower prices and earn higher revenues as well as prots than
less productive rms. Importantly, and in contrast to a framework with CES preferences,
more productive rms do not pass on all of their lower production costs to consumers but set
higher mark-ups than rms with higher costs. Firm performance measures in Eqs. (7)-(10)
are aected by tax policy in two ways: i) a direct eect through 	 and ii) an indirect eect
via changes of the cost cuto cD. We discuss these general equilibrium eects in the next
section.
2.3 Free entry and equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by two conditions. Following Eq. (4), the zero prot condition
relates the cost cuto cD =
pmax
	
to the endogenous number of rms and is given by:
cD =
1
	 ( + N)
( + Np) ; (11)




pdi = 	 cD+c
2





cdG (c). Rearranging Eq. (11) allows us to write the number of available
varieties as a function of the cost cuto cD:
N =
2 ( 	cD)
	 (cD   c)
: (12)
At the entry stage, rms pay xed entry costs fE and draw a cost parameter c from the
distribution G(c). We assume that a fraction  of entry costs is tax deductible. Free entry
ensures that expected after-tax prots are equal to the non-deductible part of xed entry
costs which leads to a second condition:
Z cD
0
 (c) dG (c) = (1  t) fE. (13)
To solve our model, we assume that productivity draws 1
c
follow a Pareto distribution on [0;





where k  1 denotes the shape









with  = 2 (k + 1) (k + 2) (cM)
k fE. A higher tax factor 	 clearly reduces cD, as eective





L	2 (2 + k) c1+kD
< 0. (15)
Hence, we observe that an increase in the tax factor aects high cost rms more than low
costs rms. The reason is that consumers of high cost varieties react more price sensitive
than consumers of low cost varieties. This implies that following an increase in the tax factor
high cost producers have to restrict mark-ups and quantities more than low cost producers.












The rst term in Eq. (16) is positive and increases in the cost dierence relative to the
marginal producer in the market. As rms exit, the number of varieties in Eq.(12) decreases
and competition is reduced. Hence, market shares are reallocated towards remaining pro-
ducers. The second eect is negative and shows the decrease in the cost cuto as discussed
above. For the rm with cost draw c = 1+k
2+k
cD the two eects exactly oset each other, i.e.
all rms with c < c (c > c) expand (reduce) outputs. For the marginal rm with c = cD
only the second eect occurs. The same intuition holds for mark-ups and prots. These
results will be central for the main implications of our study.
2.4 Tax payments of heterogeneous rms
In this section, we derive the eective tax rate to address the observed pattern that large
rms pay relatively low taxes. Common explanations for this fact include prot shifting of
large multinational rms (Desai et al. , 2006; Gumpert et al. , 2016; Davies et al. , 2018)
and better coordinated lobbying activities (Bombardini, 2008; Richter et al. , 2009). In our
framework, we show that the result of relatively low tax payments of large rms arises even
in a closed economy setting without multinational rms and in the absence of lobbying. As
we will argue in the following, the reason for this result is the interaction of tax policy with
the underlying demand structure that allows mark-ups to be endogenous.





t (p (c)  c) q (c)
(p (c)  c) q (c)
: (17)
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2 > 0: (19)
Proposition 1 In a model with linear demand and partial deductibility of production costs,
the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax prots (eective tax rate) is lower for larger rms,
whereas this ratio is constant across rms with CES-demand.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that the relationship between production costs and relative tax
payments is positive if there is both imperfect cost pass-through into prices and partial tax
deductibility of production costs. If one requirement is not met, the ratio is constant and
independent of production costs. With linear demand, there is imperfect cost pass-through.
Firms with higher marginal costs c charge higher prices and earn lower mark-ups. If  < 1,
only a fraction of this cost disadvantage is deductible, such that the ratio  (c) increases in
production costs c. Only with full deductibility ( = 1), the eective tax rate is constant
across rms. In the Appendix, we show that with CES-demand, the ratio   does not depend
on rm size. In this case, prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal production
costs and there is perfect pass-through of taxes into consumer prices.
Empirical studies nd evidence for both a positive and a negative relation between rm
size and eective tax rates (Belz et al. , 2018). Note that our framework is exible enough to
integrate both views. If production costs are subsidized (i.e.  > 1) the result in Proposition
1 is reversed and our model predicts a positive relationship between rm size and the eective
tax rate. Again, this result would not emerge in a CES framework.
One alternative explanation for the negative relationship between rm size and the ef-
fective tax rate is prot shifting of multinationals. The latter have been found to be larger
and more productive than domestic rms (Helpman et al. , 2004; Yeaple, 2009) and use tax
havens more extensively (Desai et al. , 2006). In Krautheim & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) the
use of tax havens is associated with additional xed costs such that only more productive
producers shift prots abroad. However, we show that in a framework with endogenous
mark-ups, the more productive rms pay lower eective tax rates even without prot shift-
ing. We argue, that this additional channel should be taken into account when evaluating
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the implications of tax policy across countries because otherwise the eects of tax evasion
would be overstressed. A similar argument applies to the evaluation of lobbying activities.
The relationship between eective tax rates and rm size is also aected by economy-wide
shocks. As discussed in the trade literature, we can evaluate these shocks through changes in
the cost cuto cD as a sucient statistic. Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) show that an increase
in market size L has the same implications as trade liberalization and reduces the cost cuto
cD. Both shocks increase expected prots which induces rm entry and hence, existing rms
face stronger competition. As a consequence, high cost rms have to exit the market. As
a second shock, we consider an increase in the tax factor 	, which could be caused by an
increase in the tax rate t or a decrease in the share of deductible costs . A higher tax factor
especially hurts high cost rms and reduces the cost cuto cD as shown in Eq. (15).
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2 < 0: (20)
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4 < 0: (21)
We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 2 In a model with linear demand and partial deductibility of production costs,
the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax prots increases with trade liberalization and the market
size. This increase is stronger for smaller rms.
In the public debate, globalization is perceived as an important driving force for the
heterogeneity in eective tax rates across rms as it facilitates prot-shifting of large compa-
nies. We provide a new explanation how globalization increases the dierence in relative tax
payments across rms, even in the absence of prot shifting and lobbying activities. Trade
liberalization increases the toughness of competition which reduces mark-ups especially for
smaller rms. This channel has been extensively studied in the recent trade literature, but
has received less attention in the public nance literature. Accounting for these competition
eects is crucial to evaluate the implications of prot shifting and tax evasion.











Our model has shown that the negative relationship between relative tax payments and rm
size is not necessarily an indication for prot shifting or the use of tax havens. We argue
that a tax system which allows for a partial deductibility of production costs in combination
with heterogeneous rms could generate such a result when mark-ups are endogenous. This
should be taken into account by policy makers aiming at reducing the use of tax havens as it
is not clear to what extent the negative relation between tax payments and rm size is due
to such activities. To evaluate the costs and benets of policy measures, it is important to
disentangle the dierent channels which cause the comparatively low tax payments of large
companies. In this context, controlling for competition eects of tax policy is a challenge for
future empirical work.
Moreover, we have shown an additional channel how globalization reinforces the hetero-
geneity in eective tax burdens across rms. This implies that globalization does not only
facilitate prot shifting as shown by the existing literature, but also leads to pro-competitive
eects which interact with tax policy.
Our model provides a rationale for dierences of eective tax rates across heterogeneous
rms in a very tractable way. This framework could be extended in several dimensions
related to optimal tax policy, tax competition, and country asymmetries. We hope that our
analysis encourages future work on the interaction of tax policy and pro-competitive eects.
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4 Appendix: Model with CES preferences
In this section, we show that our main result does not emerge in a CES framework. Suppose












 is the set of dierentiated varieties and  > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of







whereas P denotes the aggregate price index. Firms maximize prots in Eq. (6) subject to





which is a constant mark-up over eective marginal production costs. Computing the ratio





 (	  ) + 
 (	  1) + 1
: (25)
Hence, in a CES framework the ratio of tax payments relative to pre-tax prots is indepen-
dent of rm productivity in contrast to Proposition 1. Additionally, it does not depend on
general equilibrium eects and thus is not able to explain our result in Proposition 2.
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